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We analyze merger policy in an industry where firms participate in a non-
tournament R&D competition. We conclude that merger policy should be,
in general, less restrictive in high technology markets (pharmaceuticals
and telecoms), because mergers reduce the wasteful duplication of R&D
expenditures. However, merger policy should become more strict in (very)
asymmetric market structures. In this case, competition provides incenti-
ves for R&D, but, at the same time, duplication is avoided.
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A t least since Williamson (1968), it has been recognized that horizontal merg-ers involve a trade-off. On the one hand, they increase market power, but, onthe other hand, they may allow merging firms to reduce costs. For example,in a setting where firms compete in quantities with constant but asymmetricmarginal costs, a merger between a low cost firm and a high cost firm allows
firms to reduce costs by transferring output from the high cost firm to the low cost firm.
This merger will increase social welfare if the cost reduction is important enough i.e.
if the cost difference between merging firms is high enough [Lahiri and Ono (1988)].
In this paper we analyze how merger policy should be adapted when, apart from
quantities, firms also choose the level of cost reducing R&D investments. We con-
sider the case of an asymmetric duopoly and we want to check whether it is still true
that a merger increases welfare if the cost difference between firms is high.
When firms also compete in R&D we must take into account the following. On
the one hand, competition may lead to an excessive expenditure in R&D because cost
reducing efforts are duplicated [Lee and Wilde (1980)]. On the other hand, the merger
to monopoly may reduce the incentives to innovate below the socially efficient level.
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P (MINECO/FEDER), from Generalitat Valenciana grant PROMETEO/2013/037 and the IVIE. Part of
this research was written when Fauli-Oller was visiting the Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC.
We study the impact of market structure on the incentives of making R&D. There-
fore, we consider a model where merger decisions are taken before investments in
R&D. We could consider the case where R&D decisions are taken before merger de-
cisions as in Cabolis et al (2008). However, we think that the timing we propose is more
reasonable, because mergers involve a more long run decision than R&D decisions1.
Our analysis considers two different cases: the strategic and the non-strategic
case. In the non-strategic case, R&D and output decisions are taken simultaneously
and therefore R&D decisions are only driven by cost reducing considerations. In the
strategic case, firms set first their R&D expenditures and then their production lev-
els (both non-cooperatively). In that situation, the firms can use their R&D invest-
ments to affect the decisions of the competitors. By comparing the two contexts we
isolate the strategic role played by R&D expenditures.
In the non-strategic case, we have the same result as the one when firms only
competed in quantities: the merger increases welfare when cost differences are high
enough. The only difference is that the cost difference required for a merger to in-
crease welfare decreases as the level of R&D increases. Therefore, merger policy
should be less strict in R&D intensive industries.
In the strategic case, the rule that defines the optimal merger policy changes.
Mergers should be approved if the cost difference between firms takes intermediate
values. The surprising part of this result is that a merger including a very inefficient
firm reduces welfare. The competition provided by the inefficient firm has a posi-
tive effect. On the one hand, it stimulates the R&D of the efficient firm. On the other
hand, the asymmetry guarantees that this is done without duplication of R&D, be-
cause as it produces very little has very little incentives to spend in R&D. We have
cases where the inefficient firm does not produce but the merger would reduce wel-
fare. It is an extreme case of what we are saying, the presence of the inefficient firm
stimulates the investment of the efficient one while duplication is avoided.
Stenbacka (1992) also studies the effect of merger decisions on the level of cost-
reducing investment by firms. He considers a duopoly but only one firm can invest.
Then, the merger has not the beneficial effect it has in our setting of avoiding the du-
plication of investments and he obtains that all mergers reduce social welfare.
Next we present two merger cases where the effect of mergers on innovation
played a key role in the decision of antitrust authorities on whether to challenge or
approve a given merger. [The examples are taken from Katz and Shelanski (2007)].
They highlight the importance of our paper that studies how merger policy should
be adapted in R&D intensive industries.
The first example was the decision of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to chal-
lenge the merger, in 1993, between ZF Friedrichshafen (ZF) and the General Mo-
tors’s Allison Division. They produced the 85% of the world output of heavy-duty
automatic transmissions for trucks and buses. Despite this high percentage, they did
not compete in all markets. For example, they did not compete in North America in
which GM was dominant. But even in the markets where it did not raise anticom-
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(1) Davidson and Ferrett (2007) also consider that the merger decision is taken before the R&D in-
vestments.
petitive concerns the DOJ considered that the merger would be bad because it would
reduce the incentive of firms to innovate. The merger was later abandoned.
The second example was the decision in 2004 by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to approve the merger between Genzyme and Novazyme, the only two com-
panies with therapies for a rare disorder known as Pompe disease. The case is impor-
tant because the decision was mainly based on the innovation impact of the merger,
leaving aside questions about price and short-term competition. The merger was ap-
proved because the FTC concluded that innovation could benefit from the merger.
The decisions taken by antitrust authorities in the two cases we have presented
are contradictory. In the ZF/Allison case the merger is assumed to reduce innova-
tion while in the Genzyme/Novazyme case the merger is assumed to stimulate in-
novation. This highlights the fact that we are far from a general consensus on how
to apply competition policy in R&D intensive industries.
Nevertheless, the message of the present paper is that the competition provided
by small firms must be preserved. This idea is included in the European Merger
Guidelines [ECMG (2004)] in its paragraph 38 where it states “a firm with a rela-
tively small market share may nevertheless be an important competitive force if it
has promising pipeline products”.
In Section 1, we consider the nonstrategic model that serves us a benchmark
from which to compare the results obtained in the strategic model, that is analyzed
in Section 2. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 3.
1. BENCHMARK NON-STRATEGIC MODEL
We have two firms, firm 1 and 2, competing in a market with inverse demand
given by p = A-Q where Q is total output and p is price. Firm i’s cost function is as-
sumed to be of the form:
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(2) Introducing spillovers will lead us naturally to consider intermediate forms of competition as Re-
search Joint Ventures. To focus on the comparison between full competition and full cooperation, we
prefer to suppress spillovers in the specification of the cost function.
where xi and qi denote the level of R&D and the production of firm i respectively.
The R&D is a process (cost-reducing) innovation that by spending x2i in R&D, the
marginal cost of production will be reduced from ci to ci – xi, and the firm faces a
trade-off between paying a lump-sum cost of x2i and benefiting a lower marginal cost
of ci – xi.
We assume that Firm 1 is more efficient, c1 < c2. This cost function corresponds
to the one used in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) for the case without
spillovers2.
It is assumed that γ ≥ 1. This guarantees that the second order conditions are
satisfied. Observe that represents the effectiveness of R&D investment. When γ in-
creases the expenditure to obtain a given cost reduction also increases. The case with-
out R&D investment is obtained in the limit case when tends to infinity.
Firms decide both the level of R&D and the level of output. We will consider
two different scenarios depending on the timing of the decisions.
In this Section, we study the Non Strategic model where all decisions are taken
in the same stage. In the next Section, we consider the Strategic model where we have
a two stage game where in a first stage, the R&D decisions are taken and once they
are publicly known, output decisions are taken in a second stage. The difference be-
tween both models lies in the role played by R&D decisions. In the first model, they
are driven only by cost reducing considerations. In the second, we must also take into
account the influence they have on market competition in the second stage. These
two scenarios are common in the literature dealing with R&D competition.
To solve the model we define the profits of firm 1 and 2. To save notation, we
set, without loss of generality, A – c1 = 1. Then profits are given by:
Revista de Economía Aplicada
50
where t = c2 – c1.
Higher values of t represent higher asymmetries between firms. Results will de-
pend on two parameters namely γ (the effectiveness of R&D) and t (the degree of
asymmetry between firms).
1.1. Pre-merger situation
In equilibrium, the quantities and R&D investment are given respectively by:
when         Otherwise, we have the same situation as with merger analyzed in
Section 2.2.
The efficient firm invests in R&D more than the inefficient one. The difference
between the level of investments increases with the degree of asymmetries (t). When
the inefficient firm does not invest and does not produce.
Social welfare is assumed to be the sum of consumer surplus and firms prof-
its. Given outputs q1 and q2, and R&D levels x1 and x2 it is given by:
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Therefore the social Welfare in the non-strategic equilibrium where both firms
are active amounts to:
[1]
1.2. Post-merger situation
To study what happens when both firm merge to form a monopoly, we have to
specify the cost function of the merged entity.
We consider that the cost structure is not altered by the merger3, that is
(3) Observe that this means that the research developed in firm 2 can not be used to reduce the cost
of producing the good in firm 1.
This implies that R&D and production will be concentrated in the most efficient
firm. The merged firm will optimally choose q2 = 0 and x2 = 0.
In equilibrium the merged entity will produce:
and the optimal level of R&D will be:
The merger increases the level of R&D with respect to the level of investment
of Firm 1 in dupoly.
Social Welfare with merger is given by:
[2]
1.3. Optimal merger policy
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In this section we derive the optimal merger policy. If           we have mo-
nopoly in any case. Therefore merger policy is not an issue so that results below con-
centrate on the remaining values of t.
The optimal policy results from comparing expression [2] with [1] leading to
the results stated in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. In the non strategic case merger increases welfare when asymme -
tries are high enough, t ≥ tN (γ) where          and
This proposition confirms the result obtained in markets without R&D that in-
efficient firms are prejudicial for welfare4 [Lahiri and Ono (1988)]. In these cases,
welfare will increase if inefficient firms merge with more efficient firms. However,
merger policy should be adapted in R&D intensive industries because the greater the
effectiveness of R&D, the smaller the degree of asymmetry between firms needed
for a merger to increase welfare. This result comes from the fact that
(4) Observe that the case without R&D can be obtained in our model by letting tend to infinity. In this
case merger increases welfare when
2. STRATEGIC MODEL
2.1. Pre-merger situation
We solve first the case where both firms are active. This will be the case when
firms are not very asymmetric               Given the investments in the first stage
x1 and x2, outputs of firms in the second stage will be:
In the first stage (or R&D stage) the optimal level of R&D is given by:
These levels of R&D depend on the degree of asymmetries (t) and the effec-
tiveness of R&D (γ).
Therefore the quantity produced in equilibrium is:
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Social Welfare in equilibrium is given by:
The efficient firm invests in R&D more than the inefficient one. The difference
between the level of investments increases with the degree of asymmetries (t) When.
t =          the inefficient firm does not invest and does not produce. Observe that
the inefficient firm is expelled from the market for a lower value of t in the strate-
gic case than in the non strategic case. The reason for this is that now the R&D de-
cisions have a strategic dimension: the efficient firm overinvests in order to reduce
the output sold in Stage 2 by firm 2.
[3]
When                   firm 1 invest in R&D to expel firm 2 from the mar-
ket. In this case
and
[4]
When          we have the same situation as with merger.
2.2. Post-merger situation
We have the situation as the one analyzed in Section 2.2. In the strategic case,
the merger reduces the investment of firm 1 if
i.e. if firm 2 is inefficient enough. There has been a long debate on the effect of com-
petition on innovation. We obtain that the effect is positive if the degree of asym-
metries between firms is high enough. Nevertheless, in any case the merger increases
market price.
2.3. Optimal merger policy
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In the strategic case the optimal policy results from comparing expression [2]
with [3] for           and [2] with [4] for                  These compari-
sons lead to the results stated in proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the strategic case merger increases welfare for the intermedia -
te values of the asymmetries t
-
(γ) ≤ t ≤ t-(γ)
Observe that in the strategic case the presence of very inefficient firms can have
a positive effect on welfare. In monopoly, the level of R&D is insufficient. Then, the
competition provided by an inefficient firm has a positive effect. On the one hand,
it stimulates the R&D of the efficient firm. On the other hand, the asymmetry guar-
antees that this is done without duplication of R&D, because the inefficient firm as
it produces very little has very little incentives to spend in R&D.
Observe that for t
-
(γ)                   even though firm 2 does not pro-
duce in the duopoly equilibrium the merger would reduce welfare. This is the extreme
case of what we are saying: firm 2 stimulates the R&D investment of firm 1 and we
have no duplication, because firm 2 does not invest in R&D.
Comparing the results in section 2.3 with the ones in section 3.3 we have that
merger policy should be more restrictive in the strategic case. It is possible to check
that tN (γ) < t
-
(γ). The reason is that welfare in duopoly is greater in the strategic case
than in the non-strategic case. This result was identified by Brander and Spencer
(1983) for the symmetric case. We check that it also holds in the asymmetric case.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The result that increases in concentration may increase social welfare due to the
reduction in the duplication of R&D expenditures, connects our paper with the
schumpeterian theories. It has been studied in previous papers. Therefore, we con-
sider that our main contribution to the literature is the idea that this approach may
fail in asymmetric market structures.
When we have an efficient and an inefficient firm, it is convenient to preserve
competition (forbid the merger). In monopoly, the level of R&D is insufficient. Then,
the competition provided by an inefficient firm has a positive effect. On the one hand,
it stimulates the R&D of the efficient firm. On the other hand, the asymmetry guar-
antees that this is done without duplication of R&D, because the inefficient firm as
it produces very little has very little incentives to spend in R&D.
As the setting looks intriguing, it looks promising to generalize it in several di-
rections:
– The most obvious one is to try to solve the model for more than two firms. This
will allow us to study the type of mergers that are more likely to increase so-
cial welfare: either the ones with symmetric partners or the ones with asym-
metric ones.
– One can also introduce product differentiation. In this case, while keeping the
present formulation, the expenditure in R&D could be reinterpreted as if it af-
fected the quality of goods. Furthermore, product differentiation will allow
us to consider the case of Bertrand competition.
– One could also introduce the possibility that the expenditure in R&D is used
either to reduce costs (process innovation) or to increase the quality of goods
(product innovation). This can be used to test the empirical evidence that shows
that big firms invest more in process innovation inventions while small firms
are more inclined to carry out product innovations investments [Rosen (1991)
and Yin and Zuscovitch (1998)].
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RESUMEN
En este artículo se analiza la política de fusiones óptima en una industria
donde las empresas realizan gastos en I+D. Concluimos que la política de
fusiones debe ser, en general, menos restrictiva en mercados de alta tec-
nología (como, por ejemplo, la industria farmacéutica o la de telecomuni-
caciones), porque las fusiones reducen la duplicación ineficiente de los gas-
tos en I+D. No obstante, la política de fusiones debe ser más estricta en
estructuras de mercado muy asimétricas. En este caso, la competencia da
incentivos para realizar I+D pero, al mismo tiempo, se evita la duplicación
de los gastos.
Palabras clave: Fusiones, I+D.
Clasificación JEL: L13, L41.
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